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ARTICLE
“MILLENNIAL MOMENTUM” FOR REVISING
THE RHETORIC OF LAWYERS’
RELATIONSHIPS AND ROLES
AMELIA J. UELMEN*
INTRODUCTION
This symposium on The Lawyer’s Role and Professional Formation
posited the question of whether our conception of the professional role
should influence our conception of the professional formation of students,
and if so, how. This essay flips the framework by beginning with a reflec-
tion on the characteristics of students now entering law school. It then con-
siders how these generational sensitivities and values may bring fresh
insight to our conceptions of the professional role. Finally, it queries how
these insights might, in turn, inform how legal educators and the legal pro-
fession as a whole introduce law students and new lawyers to conceptions
of their professional role.
The basis for this analysis is admittedly tentative and anecdotal. The
first graduate students in the “Millennial” generation, frequently delineated
as born between 1982 and 2003,1 have entered law school and the legal
profession only in the past few years. The initial research on these genera-
tional trends obviously does not yet benefit from the insight or depth of
* Visiting Lecturer, Georgetown University Law Center; Director, Institute on Religion,
Law & Lawyer’s Work, Fordham University School of Law (2001–July 2011). Many thanks to
Heidi Altman, Brandon Berkowski, Paul D. Butler, Michael John Cedrone, David Koplow,
Howard Lesnick, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Russell G. Pearce, Robert K. Vischer, Ian S.
Weinstein, and Robin West for helpful discussions about the draft and comments on the manu-
script. Particular gratitude to Susanna K. Fix, not only for thoughtful edits, but also for sharing
insights on her own Millennial experience. Finally, thanks to the editors and staff of the University
of St. Thomas Law Journal for their excellent suggestions and all of the care they put into the
editing process.
1. MORLEY WINOGRAD & MICHAEL D. HAIS, MILLENNIAL MOMENTUM: HOW A NEW
GENERATION IS REMAKING AMERICA 1 (2011). But see Pew Research Center, Millennials: A Por-
trait of Generation Next 4 (Feb. 2010), http://pewresearch.org/millennials/ (marking the Millenni-
als as beginning with those born after 1980).
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historical distance.2 Further, some of the material that grounds this particu-
lar discussion—student essays, seminar conversations, and a YouTube
video-poem—is not the usual stuff of law review articles. But with these
caveats, I hope to begin fleshing out an intuition, which for me is becoming
more than a hunch: With the Millennials’ entry into law school and the
legal profession, legal educators and the legal profession as a whole have
the opportunity to revisit some of the legal profession’s seemingly tried and
true norms and review the potential for structural change.
Part I of this essay gives a brief overview of some of the characteristics
of the Millennial generation discerned thus far. Part II considers these char-
acteristics in light of a broader quest: the effort to develop a language that
pushes beyond the framework of “ontological individualism.”3 Part III de-
lineates a few aspects of the rhetoric of lawyers’ relationships and roles, and
queries how conversations with law students and lawyers of the Millennial
generation might help us to reframe these issues and push the envelope on
professional norms and structures. The essay concludes with a few observa-
tions on how Millennial openness to cross-cultural models might provide
further insight for revising and refining our rhetoric about lawyers’ relation-
ships and roles.
I. MEET THE MILLENNIALS
In Millennials Rising, an early generational study, Neil Howe and Wil-
liam Strauss offered the following snapshot of the Millennial generation:
As a group, Millennials are unlike any other youth genera-
tion in living memory. They are more numerous, more affluent,
better educated, and more ethnically diverse. More important,
they are beginning to manifest a wide array of positive social hab-
its that older Americans no longer associate with youth, including
a new focus on teamwork, achievement, modesty, and good con-
duct. Only a few years from now, this can-do youth revolution
will overwhelm the cynics and pessimists. Over the next decade,
the Millennial Generation will entirely recast the image of youth
from downbeat and alienated to upbeat and engaged—with poten-
tially seismic consequences for America.4
In Millennial Momentum, a study published in 2011, Morley Winograd
and Michael Hais noted, “Millennials, more than other generations, support
racial and ethnic equality and inclusion, and look for win-win solutions that
2. This brief essay does not provide an exhaustive survey of the research on Millennials to
date.
3. ROBERT N. BELLAH, RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER &
STEVEN M. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE
276 (1985) (defining “ontological individualism” as “the idea that the individual is the only firm
reality”).
4. NEIL HOWE & WILLIAM STRAUSS, MILLENNIALS RISING: THE NEXT GREAT GENERATION
4 (2000).
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advance the welfare of everyone, whether it’s their friends or all of soci-
ety.”5 Based on a spring 2009 survey, the study observed that Millennials
expressed a significantly greater degree of optimism than aging Baby
Boomers about their financial futures and the economy.6
Millennials look for meaning, both in what they buy and in the compa-
nies for which they choose to work.7 Considering Millennial reactions to
the popular sitcom, The Office, Winograd and Hais note: “Millennials laugh
at the quaint beings working in cubicles, certain that they will never be
forced into such a life and if, unfortunately, they are, confident that they
somehow can change its culture in ways that will benefit everyone.”8 For
88%, the “opportunity to have an impact on the world” is an important
consideration when choosing an employer.9 As one twenty-something
blogged:
The ideal career path for me would be something that either is in
the field of making the world a better place, where I can make
ends meet simply by pursing [sic] my ethical interests—or a job
with high enough pay and flexible hours that allows me to make
ends meet and do all the things that change the world for the
better, but sadly pay nothing.10
Millennials are also confident that they can change broader social
structures. According to Winograd and Hais, for this generation, Sarah
Palin was “completely off base” when she declared in her vice-presidential
nominee acceptance speech that “the world is not a community and it
doesn’t need an organizer.”11 Instead, “what the world needs most,” accord-
ing to this generation, “is thousands of community organizers, working at
the local level to solve their own country’s and the world’s problems, linked
electronically, of course, to friends around the globe.”12
Interest in socially-oriented business has spiked, pushing leading busi-
ness schools to develop programs that help respond to student interest in
5. WINOGRAD & HAIS, supra note 1, at 31. Winograd and Hais also note that Millenials
“have taken to heart the lessons imparted to them as toddlers when their parent sat them in front of
the TV to watch a show about a purple dinosaur named Barney. The program made it clear that
even though on the outside Barney was ‘as different as he could be, on the inside he was just like
you and me.’” Id.
6. Id. at 121; see also Pew Research Center, supra note 1, at 2 (noting Millennials’ 90% R
positive response to the question of having enough money or that will meet long-term financial
goals despite the tight job market).
7. See WINOGRAD & HAIS, supra note 1, at 139 (“Millennials are determined to change the
world of work once and for all. They want to create economic entities whose products or services
reflect their generation’s values and whose work environments generate energy and excitement
among employees who, in turn, feel a sense of ownership and commitment to achieving an organi-
zation’s goals.”).
8. Id. at 138.
9. Id. at 151 (citation omitted).
10. Id. at 151–52 (quoting Asher Platts on MCAmerica.org).
11. Id. at 226.
12. Id.
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learning, as one business lab director put it, how to “optimize both the bot-
tom line and the social mission” of a business.13  He explained: for this
generation, “[i]n the final analysis, businesses aren’t just businesses; they’re
also people eager to connect with community.”14
Millennials also place a high priority on relationships. In response to
the query of what is “one of the most important things in their lives,” 52%
responded being a good parent; 30%, having a successful marriage; 21%,
helping others in need; and only 15%, having a high paying career.15 Simi-
larly, Millennials aspire not to the Generation X project of “work-life bal-
ance” but rather to “work-life blending.”16 Millennial Ryan Healy explains:
I would never dream of saying I want a Family/Life balance or I
want a Friend/Life balance. . . . This whole notion of needing to
separate work and life implies that your career, which takes up 75
percent of your day, is something you simply try to get through so
you can go home and do what you really enjoy for the other 25
percent. . . . I don’t want to choose. I want a blended life.17
Winograd and Hais surmise that “employers who wish to attract top
talent will have no other choice but to accommodate the generation’s de-
mand for such things as telecommuting, flexible hours, child care, and
round-the-clock access to technology to create a seamless blend between
working and raising a family.”18
The “reversal” of the more cynical Generation X mindset toward a
more hopeful Millennial outlook is graphically portrayed in a video-poem
by Jonathan Reed, Lost Generation.19 The video scans down a series of
seemingly pessimistic propositions about the certainty of a dark future:
I am part of a lost generation
And I refuse to believe that
I can change the world
I realize this may be a shock but
“Happiness comes from within”
is a lie, and
“Money will make me happy”
So in 30 years I will tell my children
13. Id. at 153 (quoting Adlai Wertman, director of the Society and Business Lab, University
of Southern California Marshall School of Business).
14. Id.
15. Pew Research Center, supra note 1, at 2.
16. See Millennials Want Work-Life Blending (Not Balance), YPULSE (Jan. 10, 2012), http://
www.ypulse.com/millennials-want-work-life-blending-not-balance.
17. WINOGRAD & HAIS, supra note 1, at 205 (citation omitted).
18. Id.
19. See Jonathan Reed, Lost Generation, YOUTUBE, (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=42E2fAWM6rA&feature=player_embedded. This video originally appeared as an
entrant in the August 2007 YouTube AARP U@50 Video Contest, open to people between the
ages of eighteen and thirty. Contestants submitted short videos on the subject of what they expect
their lives to be like at age fifty.
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they are not the most important things in my life.
My employer will know that
I have my priorities straight because
work
is more important than
family
I tell you this
Once upon a time
Families stayed together
but this will not be true in my era
this is a quick fix society
Experts tell me
30 years from now I will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of
my divorce
I do not concede that
I will live in a country of my own making
In the future
Environmental destruction will be the norm
No longer can it be said that
My peers and I care about this earth
It will be evident that
My generation is apathetic and lethargic
It is foolish to presume that
There is hope.
The video then retraces its steps, scanning up through the same proposi-
tions, but reading them in reverse:
There is hope.
It is foolish to presume that
My generation is apathetic and lethargic
It will be evident that
My peers and I care about this earth
No longer can it be said that
Environmental destruction will be the norm
In the future
I will live in a country of my own making
I do not concede that
30 years from now I will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of
my divorce
Experts tell me
this is a quick fix society
but this will not be true in my era
Families stayed together
Once upon a time
I tell you this
family
is more important than
work
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I have my priorities straight because
My employer will know that
They are not the most important thing in my life.
So in 30 years I will tell my children
“Money will make me happy”
is a lie, and
“Happiness comes from within”
I realize this may be a shock but
I can change the world
and I refuse to believe that
I am part of a lost generation
In the course of teaching law school seminars, my own discussions
with law students have given me reason to believe that there is something
more to this “reversal” than a sentimental fad. For example, in the past few
years I have noticed a marked generational shift in discussions with stu-
dents about the potential for change in law firm schedules.20 In 2000, the
year that the market bubble pushed large-firm starting salaries for first-year
associates to $125,000, my own efforts to start a serious conversation with
my Generation X colleagues about more flexible schedules in exchange for
less money were met with deep pessimism. Very few associates at the firm
where I worked thought it was even worth having a discussion, either be-
cause partners and other powers that be in the firm could not be trusted to
keep their end of the bargain, or because even raising the issue at that point
might in some way disturb the market’s lock-step push toward higher sala-
ries.21 An email from one of my colleagues baldly expressed the heights of
this Generation X cynicism: “Shut up, Uelmen, we want the money.”
When I began teaching law school seminars and ethics classes in 2001,
I observed that my students also seemed fairly cynical about the extent to
which law firms could be responsive to young lawyers’ desires to spend
more time with family and in other non-work activities. The general senti-
ment seemed to be that large firms allowed very little room for creative
pushback and that if you sign up for that kind of job, then you must take it
on the terms dictated by large-firm culture.
In the past three years, however, the same class readings with students
at the same point in their professional development have generated a com-
pletely different discussion. The general tenor of the discussion now seems
to move toward this question: “If this lifestyle isn’t working for people,
then why shouldn’t we try to change it?” In listening to current law stu-
dents’ reflections on their aspirational work arrangements, I detect a
profound resonance with the “reversal” at the center of the “Lost Genera-
20. One of the springboards for these class discussions is an essay that I wrote about the
process of trying to work out a part-time arrangement at a large law firm in the late 1990s. See
Amelia J. Uelmen, The Evils of “Elasticity”: Reflections on the Rhetoric of Professionalism and
the Part-Time Paradox in Large Firm Practice, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81 (2005).
21. Id. at 115 n.118.
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tion” poem: “My employer will know that / I have my priorities straight
because / work / is more important than / family” is becoming “I tell you
this / family / is more important than / work / I have my priorities straight
because / My employer will know that / they are not the most important
thing in my life.”22
It is still early to draw conclusions about the characteristics or cultural
trajectory of the Millennials. Further, the perspectives of students as they
observe the legal profession from the distance of the law school classroom
may differ substantially from the perspectives of young lawyers immersed
in the workforce. And, of course, generational analysis is just one measure
of the seismic shifts that have in recent years shaken the foundations of both
legal education and the legal profession as we have known it.23 This essay’s
analysis is admittedly tentative in part because it is difficult to dissect a
moving target with so many moving parts.24
In spite of these limitations, it is possible to discern some key ques-
tions and themes for the research agenda moving forward. Part II considers
how the current generational trajectory might impact professional formation
from the perspective of language, focusing on the disjunction between this
generation’s aspirations and the rhetorical tools that they have to express
them. Part III then considers how this insight might shed light on the lan-
guage we use to describe the lawyer’s role and bring students and young
lawyers into the legal profession.
II. MILLENNIALS: REACHING BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF
“ONTOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM”
If it is true that Millennials are less individualistic, more sensitive to
the priority of building relationships, and more open to team building, a
22. Reed, supra note 19.
23. See, e.g., Stephen R. Strahler, New Law Firm Reality: The Changes Rocking the Legal
Profession Will Outlast the Recession, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Feb. 15, 2010, at 15, 15–17; Patrick G.
Lee, Law Schools Get Practical, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2011, at B5; ALI-ABA CONTINUING
PROF’L EDUC. & ASSOC. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., EQUIPPING OUR LAWYERS: THE FINAL
REPORT OF THE CRITICAL ISSUES SUMMIT (2010).
24. An important “moving part” in generational analysis is the debate over the changing
nature of young adulthood.  Some of the idealism and optimism that Millennials express into their
late twenties and early thirties may also be interpreted as the effect of many in this generation not
yet having fully assumed adult responsibilities. See, e.g., JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING
ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES 16 (2004)
(describing the stage of “emerging adulthood” as “an age of high hopes and great expectations, in
part because few of their dreams have been tested in the fires of real life. . . . The dreary, dead-end
jobs, the bitter divorces, the disappointing and disrespectful children that some of them will find
themselves experiencing in the years to come—none of them imagine that this is what the future
holds for them.”); see also Robin Marantz Henig, What Is It About 20-Somethings?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Aug. 22, 2010, at MM28, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/magazine/
22Adulthood-t.html?pagewanted=all (describing debates over whether “emerging adulthood” con-
stitutes a distinct stage in developmental psychology). I am grateful for conversations with Paul
Butler and David Koplow, which led me to more nuanced analysis on this point.
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first question might be whether these characteristics will pave the way for
new descriptions of the professional role—descriptions that are more recep-
tive to incorporating these qualities.
In my recent conversations with students, I have noticed that the stu-
dents’ critiques of received wisdom about professional life at times focus on
the need to find a philosophical framework and a language to articulate
substantive values. The voice of one of my most thoughtful students ex-
presses this well. I will call him Brian. He is from the Midwest and worked
for a few years before law school. Brian is in his mid-30s, right at the cusp
of the Millennials. What follows is an excerpt from his 2010 seminar essay,
which focused on the search for a framework for making professional judg-
ments and a language to express these values:
As an impressionable college English major, I, along with
several of my closest friends, fell under the sway of a charismatic
professor who was a reckless proponent of secular relativism and
never missed an opportunity to trash . . . anything that sounded
like objective truth. It was not long before he had us talking and
thinking like him and applying postmodern relativism to every
situation. I left college believing that every aspect of mainstream
society was part of an evil capitalistic conspiracy. One hallmark
of all of this thinking was that it was reductive.
The further I got from college and the longer I lived in New
York, the more I felt a sense that all the discourses to which I was
exposed were similarly reductive. My job at the time—as a
“Photoshop guy” and “web guy” for a big modeling agency—
showed me two unsavory sides of business: (1) the degree to
which the whole person is not respected in the fashion industry;
and (2) the degree to which certain types of businesses are willing
to abuse employees and act unethically in other ways in order to
meet short-term goals.
This was also the post-9/11 Bush period, and I became very
sensitive to the tenor of mainstream discourse concerning
America’s foreign and domestic policy. With its “my-way-or-the-
highway” self-satisfaction, American discourse seemed entirely
incapable of anything like cultural understanding or introspection,
and it seemed dangerously reductive in its willingness to overlay
black and white notions of good and evil on such a complex
global situation.
In short, my job, my country’s politics, and my own educa-
tional background all compounded in the years before I came to
law school and left me with a strong sense that something very
important was missing. All of these things seemed misguided and
reductive. Nonetheless I did not have the language or tools to
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think about these things and to criticize them. I kept applying my
own black and white reductive discourse to them.25
On one hand, Brian’s analysis reflects a kind of classic generational
pushback, expressed in profound dissatisfaction with educational, eco-
nomic, and political models as he had experienced them thus far. But in a
closer read, and reading between the lines, I also see something new—a
certain hope, and perhaps even confidence, that it might be possible to “re-
verse” these trends and even find the language to get beyond a “black and
white reductive discourse.” For example, in the part of his essay discussing
economic structures, he indicates a readiness to dig deeper, even if that
means hard work. He writes:
Business today is more or less conducted to enrich and em-
power private parties; a mere byproduct of the work, in some
sense, is that it also meets people’s needs. In other words, it has
not incorporated a proper respect for the fullness of the human
person—but it could.
When he wrote his essay, I do not think that Brian had in mind the
1985 sociological study of American individualism, Habits of the Heart.26
(It was not part of the assigned class reading.) Nonetheless, his analysis
closely tracks the study’s conclusions about the rhetorical limitations of
American discourse. Interviewing more than 200 white, middle-class Amer-
icans, sociologist Robert Bellah and a team of researchers traced some of
the consequences of what they found to be Americans’ “first language” of
individualism, which “values independence and self-reliance above all
else.”27 What they termed “ontological individualism”—“the idea that the
individual is the only firm reality”—had resulted in a society in which
“every social obligation was vulnerable, every tie between individuals
fragile.”28
What is especially interesting about the Habits of the Heart analysis is
the distinction it drew between the language that the interviewees used and
their lived experience. As the research team described, it was not that they
encountered moral monsters, or even “empty selves”—most interviewees
were, in fact, “serious, engaged, deeply involved in the world.”29 But to the
extent that they could only speak the language of “radical individual auton-
omy,” they seemed to have very little capacity for imagining themselves as
something more than “arbitrary centers of volition.”30 Even if they did
25. Original student essay on file with the author. Quoted and slightly edited with the stu-
dent’s explicit permission, on file with the author.
26. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 3.
27. ROBERT BELLAH, RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER & STEVEN
M. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE viii
(1996).
28. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 3, at 276.
29. Id. at 81.
30. Id.
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sense that a deeper framework was at work in their lives and their decisions,
they did not possess the language or cultural concepts to articulate it: “They
cannot express the fullness of being that is actually theirs.”31 The Habits of
the Heart researchers concluded that there is something seriously missing in
our cultural framework: “[I]ndividualism alone does not allow persons to
understand certain basic realities of their lives, especially their interdepen-
dence with others. These realities become more salient as individual effort
alone proves inadequate to meet the demands of living.”32
As Brian’s essay reveals, he is acutely aware that the rhetorical tools
he has received through his education and work experience—the language
of postmodern relativism, consumerism, and polarized politics—do not en-
able him to express “the fullness of being” that is his.33 But on the cusp of
the Millennial generation, and perhaps as an early expression of the genera-
tional “reversal,” he describes these cultural tendencies as “misguided and
reductive,” and he reaches for rhetorical tools that will help him to “think
about these things and criticize them.” Within and between the lines of his
text, one can see that Brian actually believes that it might be possible for
businesses to respect “the fullness of the human person” and for his country
to move beyond its “‘my-way-or-the-highway’ self-satisfaction.”  Brian
and his generation still move in a world in which it seems that people are
reduced to “arbitrary centers of volition,”34 and “every social obligation [is]
vulnerable, every tie between individuals fragile.”35 But, nonetheless, Brian
believes that these trends can be reversed. He also believes that it is worth
the effort to push beyond the limits of “reductive discourse” in order to
develop the linguistic tools he needs to articulate these hopes for positive
and constructive change.
Read in the light of the Habits of the Heart analysis, Brian’s essay
gives a glimpse of how Millennials are beginning to see with increasing
clarity that “individualism alone” does not give them the rhetorical or cul-
tural tools that they need to understand their world, “especially their inter-
dependence with others.”36 These limitations become increasingly salient,
not only as each person journeys through life and experiences the extent to
which “individual effort alone proves inadequate to meet the demands of
living,”37 but also as society moves through time. Brian articulates well
how the rhetoric of “ontological individualism” has failed to equip his gen-
eration with the kind of “cultural understanding or introspection” which
could help us to face our current “complex global situation.” Brian and his
31. Id.
32. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 27, at ix.
33. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 3, at 81.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 276.
36. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 27, at ix.
37. Id.
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generation may not have ready answers, but they are poised to work toward
change.
III. “MILLENNIAL MOMENTUM” FOR THE RHETORIC OF LAWYERS’
RELATIONSHIPS AND ROLES
This section considers how a Millennial “reversal” might be applied to
various aspects of the rhetoric we use to describe lawyers’ relationships and
roles, and how this in turn might impact the professional formation of law
students and new lawyers.
A. Building on Efforts to Dislodge Individualistic Notions of Client
Autonomy
It would be fair to say that a rhetoric analogous to that described in
Habits of the Heart as “ontological individualism” has claimed an impor-
tant place in modern descriptions of lawyers’ relationships and roles. In
many descriptions of the lawyer’s professional role, America’s “first lan-
guage” of individualism, which “values independence and self-reliance
above all else,”38 is still predominant, in the sense that individualistic no-
tions of autonomy—and in particular “client autonomy”—seem to be the
undisputed centerpiece.
In his work to define what it means to ground lawyer-client relation-
ships in respect for human dignity, legal ethicist David Luban notes:
Americans are in love with freedom of choice. Legal histo-
rian Lawrence Friedman, analyzing contemporary American legal
culture, refers to us as “the Republic of Choice.” The fact that we
don’t like someone else telling us what to do suggests that the
offensive feature of paternalism lies in its violation of auton-
omy—that paternalism offends human dignity because autonomy
is, or is the basis of, human dignity.39
Luban distinguishes autonomy as understood in American culture from
Kant’s understanding of “auto-nomy” meaning self-legislation, giving law
to oneself and acting accordingly. Luban explains:
That is surely not what we mean by “autonomy” when we
think of freedom of choice in the ordinary sense prevailing in
American culture. Freedom of choice means doing whatever I
want; that is, not having to do what others want me to do, or even
to consider except in a calculating way what others might wish.
Freedom of choice means consumer sovereignty. It means don’t
tread on me. It means my way or the highway. The difference
between this and Kantian autonomy could not be sharper. For
Kant, autonomy lies in the power to act on the basis of duty rather
38. Id. at viii.
39. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 75 (2009).
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than inclination, whereas in American culture, with its strong lib-
ertarian streak, it means the power of acting on inclination rather
than duty. Kantian autonomy represents freedom achieved
through stoic self-control and self-command; it means reasoned
self-restraint. Freedom of choice represents casting off
restraints.40
When “client autonomy” is understood in such individualistic terms,
for some the consequence is to see the heart of the lawyer’s professional
role as simply facilitating the client’s freedom of choice. According to
Daniel Markovits, the “professionally detach[ed]” lawyer should be com-
pletely effaced in front of the client.41 He analogizes to John Keats’s idea of
“negative capability” as the starting point for a description of lawyer fidel-
ity to clients.42 Through self-effacement, the poet maintains “‘no identity’
of his own” and so becomes a medium for some other body.43 Likewise, the
professionally detached lawyer effaces herself, “or at least her personal be-
liefs about the claims and causes that she argues,” so as to let her otherwise
inarticulate clients speak through her.44 In Markovits’s view, the good law-
yer steadfastly suppresses her own ego in order to speak her client’s mind.45
Images of lawyers as mere technicians or as “hired guns” are rooted in a
reverence for client-autonomy, defined as casting off restraints, and as a
consequence, lawyer self-effacement before a client’s demands.
In past decades, however, legal ethicists have engaged in a rich and
creative discourse about how to break through the constraints of a cramped
notion of autonomy and role morality in order to see clients as much more
than “arbitrary centers of volition”46 and to claim their own moral responsi-
bility for their work and role in the legal system. As legal ethics scholar
Russell Pearce put it succinctly, Model Rule 1.0 should read: “Lawyers are
morally accountable.”47 The work of William Simon and David Luban, for
example, has in different ways laid important foundations for considering
how concerns for justice and fairness should inform perspectives on the
lawyer’s moral responsibility for her role in society and in her relationships
with clients.48
40. Id. at 75–76.
41. DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 93 (2008).
42. Id. (emphasis omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 94; see also LUBAN, supra note 39, at 68–70 (discussing philosopher Alan Dona-
gan’s justification for the adversary system as lending “voice” to the client’s story).
46. Id. at 81.
47. Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers Are Morally Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1805, 1807 (2002).
48. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER’S ETHICS (2000). See also LUBAN,
supra note 39, at 76 (countering the notion that the concept of autonomy exhausts the basis of
human dignity, because autonomy addresses only one human faculty, the will: “[H]onoring some-
one’s dignity means honoring their being, not merely their willing. Their being transcends the
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Other legal theorists have prodded and pulled apart the limits of “bi-
nary” legal structures and solutions that place excessive emphasis on the
“dualities” of the defendant, the opposing side, the client, those inside the
law, and those outside.49 In setting out a framework for an ethics of altru-
ism, Carrie Menkel-Meadow challenged: “What would lawyering look like
if we took the other seriously—as a person, as a part of our shared human-
ity?”50 Similarly, Stephen Ellmann theorized how an “ethic of care” could
provide a foundation for legal ethics.51 In discussing and critiquing Ell-
man’s work, Marie Failinger described this ethic as one in which “lawyers
would function out of connection, perhaps even empathy, with their clients
instead of from a position of detachment,” creating and sustaining respon-
sive connections with adversaries and with others, working to avoid pain,
and choosing tactics and strategies that mirror responsibility for third
parties.52
Through studies on the “difference” that reflection on race and gender
might bring to ethical decision-making, legal theorists have drawn out im-
plications for legal ethics that tend to push beyond individualistic interpre-
tations of client autonomy and lawyers’ moral accountability.53 Similarly,
streams of virtue ethics as applied to legal ethics54 and the “religious lawy-
choices they make. It includes the way they experience the world—their perceptions, their pas-
sions and sufferings, their reflections, their relationships and commitments, what they care about.
Strikingly, the experience of caring about someone or something has a phenomenology very dif-
ferent from that of free choice. When I care about something, it chooses me—we sometimes say,
‘it grabs me’—rather than the other way around.”); Marie A. Failinger, Face-ing the Other: An
Ethics of Encounter and Solidarity in Legal Services Practice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2071, 2083
(1999) (discussing the influence of the work of Simon and Luban in “signaling the reappearance
of the lawyer’s moral sense into the ethical dialogue”); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and
Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 224 (1991) (noting the extent to which
autonomy and paternalist approaches to counseling can accommodate dialogic praxis and con-
cerns about the dangers of oppressing or misunderstanding clients).
49. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering? 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 385,
386 (1992); see also id. at 387 (“We learn early in our education to distance ourselves from the
other and, in our ethical rules, to justify, if not encourage, a variety of practices that many lay
people would find reprehensible if applied in everyday life. To say that lawyers should consider,
let alone care, for the other side of a legal problem is probably close to blasphemous in our
lawyering practices. Nevertheless, I want to explore the possibility of expressing in the context of
lawyering a different conception of ethics—altruism or the care for the other.”).
50. Id. at 407.
51. See Stephen Ellman, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665, 2668
(1993).
52. Failinger, supra note 48, at 2091–92.
53. See generally “Critical Theories” (Chapter Five) in SUSAN D. CARLE, LAWYERS’ ETHICS
AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER, 224 ff, (2005).
54. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003); see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAW-
YERS, CLIENTS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 44 (1994) (placing “client goodness” at the center of
counseling and representation); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be
Good Ethical Deliberators? 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996) (discussing the extent to which black-
letter codes are limited in their ability to inspire ethical practice). See generally CALIN FARRELLY
& LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (2008).
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ering movement” have also brought to the legal ethics discourse ample re-
flection on how a lawyer’s philosophical or religious perspectives and
commitments may shape his or her approach to the professional role.55
Each of these theories is complex, and many aspects of the various
theories are in tension with each other. This essay does not dive into those
nuances but makes the narrow point that for decades legal scholars have
been hard at work on theories that dislodge the extent to which individualis-
tic notions of client autonomy still hold a tight grip on the rhetoric describ-
ing lawyers’ relationships and roles. Considering the contribution that
Millennial perspectives and attitudes make to these already substantial theo-
retical efforts, the novelty that they bring is not the insight that discussions
about lawyers’ roles must be sensitive to the ways in which lawyers and
their clients are imbedded in a web of relationships, social structures, and
responsibilities to society; those ideas have long been in circulation.
Instead, the novelty may be a certain generational momentum that
arises from a Millennial awareness that they are not alone in believing that
it might actually be possible to dislodge the profoundly individualistic para-
digms through which we view social life and commitments. As the “Lost
Generation” reversal reads: “It is foolish to presume that / My generation is
apathetic and lethargic;” and “It will be evident that my peers and I care
about this earth.” Because their horizon includes identifying the lie of a
“quick fix society,” not just the limitations of individual responses to social
problems, the Millennials have the potential to frame their efforts as part of
a broader cultural trajectory and a larger vision. For this reason, Millennials
may just have a shot at getting the kind of traction for the social shift that
we need to break through some of the difficult tensions in how we envision
lawyers’ relationships and roles.
B. Millennial Momentum for Revising the Rhetoric of the Professional
Role
The following sections build on the work of “relational ethics” as ap-
plied to legal ethics and the extent to which these analyses already provide a
solid theoretical basis for dislodging the more individualistic foundations of
legal ethics. Based on observations about the Millennial generation’s cul-
tural trajectory, the following subsections aim to make a narrow point: that
while much of the substance of these theories of relational legal ethics aim
toward appreciation for a more socially connected vision of lawyering, the
rhetoric at times still reveals traces of “ontological individualism.” Further
55. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal De-
mocracy, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127 (2004) (tracing the history of the religious lawyering
movement and the impact of its ideas on legal ethics); Robert K. Vischer, Heretics in the Temple
of Law: The Promise and Peril of the Religious Lawyering Movement, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 427
(2004) (analyzing the extent to which lawyers’ efforts to integrate religious beliefs into their legal
practice threaten the legal profession’s traditional conceptions of professional identity).
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conversation with Millennials, drawing on their own values and perspec-
tives, might present a unique opportunity to refine the rhetoric we use to
describe lawyers’ relationships and roles so that we might better align our
language with our efforts to reshape professional paradigms and also better
express the “fullness of a being” that is already implicit in the various mod-
els of relational ethics.
1. Helping Individual Lawyers See Their Work as Part of a
Mosaic of Community Commitments
In legal ethics, an initial step—one that precedes building a relation-
ship with any client—is the more foundational question of how lawyers
choose to focus their time, talents, and energy, as expressed by the type of
practice in which they choose to engage and, on a day-to-day level, by the
clients that they choose to accept.
Explaining the recent history of relational ethics as applied to legal
services practice, Marie Failinger set out various scenarios that capture the
basic lines of the varying approaches.56 One of her narratives is based on
the analysis of Charles Fried, in his famous essay, “The Lawyer as
Friend.”57 In the narrative, a lawyer reflects on her encounter with Littie A.,
a battered woman who has entered the lawyer’s office needing immediate
assistance to escape from a potentially life-threatening situation.
My only problem is that I have already decided to spend the
next year working on a major welfare impact case which will take
all of my time if I do it right, other than what I need for myself
and my family. . . . My client, Juanita M. is counting on me to
help her fulfill her dream of getting off of welfare and becoming a
nurse, and I have made a firm commitment to her and her chil-
dren. Moreover, I have to admit, I derive satisfaction out of im-
pact work, it fulfills my needs as a professional. After all, I am a
“responsible, valuable and valuing agent” who must first of all be
“[d]ear to [my]self”; my concern for others must “presuppose a
concern for [myself].” Because I am a person, not a resource, I
am entitled to bestow my talents and time entirely according to
my own discretion.58
Failinger’s thoughtful analysis both appreciates the extent to which
Fried’s “friendship” model reflects “a deformed ethics of autonomy” and
critiques various aspects of the model’s limitations.59 But reading this ex-
56. See Failinger, supra note 48, at 2078–85.
57. Id. at 2079 (citing Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1068–71, 1077–78 (1976)).
58. Id. (discussing how various theories of “relational ethics” grapple with legal ethics dilem-
mas at the heart of the lawyer-client relationship) (citing Fried, supra note 57, at 1068–71,
1077–78).
59. See id. (“Friends . . . are not just friends to further the friend’s interest or autonomy; they
are friends because of the intrinsic worth of the relationship, the mutuality of their values, and the
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ample in light of Millennial attitudes and perspectives, it is interesting to
note the lawyer’s basic stance in the face of competing demands: she sees
herself as a lonely savior. Even though the story recounts one example of
“relational ethics,” in the sense that it analyzes lawyers’ relationships and
commitments to clients and potential clients, the lawyer’s own fundamental
stance is that of solitude. She does not pick up the phone to see if another
lawyer friend or social worker could help the battered woman. She does not
send a call for help to any other group of lawyers or professionals. Given
the financial constraints many legal service offices face, it is not far-fetched
to conclude that many battered women do not get the legal help that they
need and deserve. But it is nonetheless interesting to note all of the ways in
which the model does not open out toward the community of lawyers, so-
cial workers, and other professionals who could potentially work together to
respond to individual needs and solve social problems.
Similarly, in a provocative essay, Thomas Shaffer sharply critiques the
ethics rule against providing financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation.60 He describes one case in which a
court order required that a client procure a bed for her baby as a condition
of having the baby home for Christmas. On the day before Christmas, when
the charities were already closed, who would be so wooden, so lacking in
humanity, as to say it was wrong for the lawyer to buy the crib with her
own money?61 But on second thought, might this scenario also belie some-
thing of the lonely savior? Was there really no way at all to connect the
client with a larger community of people who might want to help a mother
to spend Christmas with her baby? Was the lawyer herself, or were the
other professionals involved in the case, so disconnected from other sources
of community life that this option did not even come to mind?62
How might Millennials interact with these “lonely savior” models,
which seem to present intractable dilemmas on how to orient one’s own
time, talents, and commitments? First, for a more team-based generation
which sees the “world as a community” in which people work out local
sacredness of the person. A friend will challenge a friend as much as support her, will say ‘no’ as
much as ‘yes’ to the friend’s demands, all in support of the moral possibilities cherished by the
friend and the self.”).
60. Thomas Shaffer, On Living One Way in Town and Another Way at Home, 31 VALPARA-
ISO UNIV. L. REV. 879, 886 (1997) [hereinafter Shaffer, On Living One Way]. Among other feats,
Shaffer is to be credited for some of the initial and most-groundbreaking critique of the “ethics of
aloneness.” See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV.
963, 970 (1987).
61. Shaffer, On Living One Way, supra note 60, at 887.
62. As the editors of this Journal report, when a similar scenario arose for a Millennial gener-
ation University of St. Thomas Law School graduate, this time regarding a client’s need for a
stroller, the lawyer shared her concern with other members of the legal community, who pooled
their money to buy what the client needed. See Memorandum from Erin Westbrook, Senior Edi-
tor, University of St. Thomas Law Journal, to author (Jan. 23, 2012) (on file with the University of
St. Thomas Law Journal).
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problems on a local level, one wonders if this might also unfold into a
generational capacity to look beyond the tendency to see oneself as a lone
and lonely savior in front of particular social problems in order to appreci-
ate the power of seeing one’s own efforts as part of and connected to a
larger mosaic of social commitment.
Second, a generation that asserts “I tell you this / family / is more
important than / work / I have my priorities straight because / My employer
will know that / they are not the most important thing in my life” has dis-
covered, or is going to quickly discover, that “lonely savior” models do not
mesh with the kind of practical line drawing needed in order to have enough
time for one’s family. A generation with a more robust sense of “blending”
their social commitments might just have the creative insight not only to see
their clients as part of a relational web, but also to define their own founda-
tional commitments as lawyers within a larger network of commitment to
justice. If so, then perhaps a Millennial response to the appearance of Littie
A. in her office doorway might read something like this:
I have already decided to spend the next year working on a
major welfare impact case which will take all of my time if I do it
right, other than what I need for myself and my family. . . . My
client, Juanita M. is counting on me to help her fulfill her dream
of getting off of welfare and becoming a nurse, and I have made a
firm commitment to her and her children. Within the realistic lim-
its of my own time and resources, this is what I can do right now.
I make a plan to reach out to others who may be able to assist
Littie A., and realize that personally I will not have time to be
involved.  I do not feel guilty about this, because I see my own
work for the reform of welfare policy as deeply connected to the
commitments of many others who are also working to make this a
better world for Littie A. and others who are similarly situated.
2. Rethinking the Rhetoric of Client-Centered Counseling
A second area to explore Millennial contributions to a potential rhetor-
ical shift is in descriptions of “client-centered” counseling and representa-
tion. First introduced in 1977 by David Binder and Susan Price in their
groundbreaking textbook on client counseling and interviewing,63 this
model of “client-centered” counseling and representation has thoroughly
permeated legal education. The first edition of the book generated substan-
tial controversy, especially for its bright line rule that respect for client au-
tonomy means that lawyers should never give clients their own opinion.64
63. DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CEN-
TERED APPROACH (1977).
64. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Client Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 504–05 (1990); see also Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39
UCLA L. REV. 697 (1992) (reviewing the 1991 edition of the Binder, Bergman, and Price text);
Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation,
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With the release of the book’s third edition, the text retains its center-stage
position in legal education.65
While at first glance one might be tempted to collapse “client-cen-
tered” with “self-centered,” it would be a mistake to presume that the term
necessarily implies an individualistic framework in the sense that only cli-
ent interests matter. In a thoughtful article, Katherine Kruse has traced how
over the years following the release of the 1977 text the term “client-cen-
tered” has assumed a variety of meanings and forms, some aspects of which
are in tension with others.66 For example, some theories of client-centered
counseling interpreted the phrase as a reminder to focus representation on
the client as a person rather than a “cardboard” caricature in which the
client is perceived as a bundle of legal issues or rights.67 As a teaching tool
used especially in clinical legal education, “client-centered” techniques
have proven effective in helping law students move beyond their precon-
ceptions about the professional role in order to encounter clients as real
people with their own voices and narratives, with their own perspectives on
both the legal issues and how they might impact other commitments.68 In
light of this complexity of multiple meanings, Kruse suggests that the best
way to understand client-centered representation is to acknowledge that the
term embraces “plural values.”69
Kruse also proposes “plural” interpretations of the concepts of client
autonomy, which is the theoretical foundation and philosophical inspiration
for client-centered counseling. Contending that the admittedly ambiguous
concept of autonomy is undertheorized in legal ethics,70 she explains how
autonomy in this context should embrace not only the negative freedom
from restraint71 but also notions of “positive liberty.”72 For example, de-
pending on what constrains a person from the positive “project of self-au-
12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 380 (2006) (“The position that lawyers should not try to offer advice to
clients was concededly overstated, and later versions of the client-centered approach qualified its
extremity.”).
65. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BRUCE BERGMAN, PAUL R. TREMBLAY & IAN S. WEINSTEIN,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (3d ed. 2012).
66. Kruse, supra note 64, at 372.
67. See, e.g., id. at 377–78 (“[L]awyers must overcome their professional tendency to treat
clients as bundles of legal rights and interests walking around inside a body, and put the client as a
whole person at the center of the representation.”); id. at 382 (discussing the problem of treating
clients as bundles of legal issues, using the law to pursue these interests, without understanding
their actual values). See also Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103 (2010).
68. Kruse, supra note 64, at 371–74; see also id. at 378 (describing how the technique fo-
cuses on “the importance of the lawyer understanding the clients’ perspectives, emotions and
values”).
69. Id. at 374; see id. at 419 (describing the plural values of a “client-centered” taxonomy in
which the client is at the center instead of legal issues; the lawyer’s construction of the client; the
client’s stated wishes; the interests of third parties; or the client’s best interests).
70. Id. at 399.
71. Id. at 401 (“Liberal political theory places primary importance on the promotion of au-
tonomy, defined as the ability of individuals to develop and pursue their own conceptions of the
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thorship,” genuine promotion of autonomy may involve more than leaving a
person alone.73 Intervention may actually expand one’s range of choices,
and some short-range forms of constraint may actually preserve long-range
future freedom.74 Client-centered counseling should help lawyers to deter-
mine the “important difference” between “helping someone achieve what
she really wants or values, and imposing what you think she should really
want to value on her.”75
One risk of pouring plural forms of interpretation into these particular
keywords is that many lawyers, law students, and clients are likely to inter-
pret them against the backdrop of their first language of “ontological indi-
vidualism,” a rhetoric which does not facilitate the work of articulating the
nuances of relationship or interactions within our social fabric. The sub-
stance of client-centered counseling may promise flexible sensitivity and
receptivity to the complexity of the web of relationships in which the client
is imbedded, as well as profound attention to the quality of the relationship
between lawyer and client. But so long as we remain bound by the linguis-
tic framework of “ontological individualism” we will struggle to express
the “fullness of being” at the heart of lawyer-client relationships. As a re-
sult, more rigidly individualistic notions of client autonomy and client-
centeredness may creep into descriptions of lawyer-client relationships.
Take, for example, how Luban’s description of the lawyer’s receptivity to
client narrative is caught up in the “egocentric predicament.”76
Fuller once described the advocate’s job as displaying the
case “in the aspect it assumes when viewed from that corner of
life into which fate has cast his client.” The client’s story is not
just the story in which she figures; it is the story she has to tell. It
is about her in both senses of the term: she is its subject-matter,
and she is its center. It revolves about her, just as, to terrestrials,
the sun revolves about the earth (no more and no less). . . .
[T]autologically, my world revolves around me; tautologically,
that is, I am the one necessary being in my world. Human dignity
is in some sense a generalization from the egocentric
predicament.77
As some theories of client-centered counseling attest, respect for client
subjectivity and the integrity of client narrative does not necessarily reduce
legal counseling to a concession to “egocentric” clients. Luban himself is
good without state interference, within limits set to ensure that they do not unduly interfere with
the liberty of others.”).
72. Id. at 404 (citing Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy
ed., 2002)) (distinguishing negative and positive liberty).
73. Id. at 405.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 410.
76. LUBAN, supra note 39, at 71.
77. Id. at 70–71.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-2\UST207.txt unknown Seq: 20  7-DEC-12 10:15
2011] MILLENNIAL MOMENTUM 465
sensitive to this dimension. But the linguistic images of clients as “cor-
nered” and as subjects who see themselves as “the one necessary being in
their world” does not facilitate the work of breaking out of “egocentric”
frameworks and limits.
A second risk of the “client-centered” rhetoric is that it may also carry
some of the limitations of an approach grounded in Carl Rogers’s theories
of psychotherapy. As Kruse explains, in the Rogerian approach to psycho-
therapy, the goal of therapy is defined as “internal to the client,” and in this
context, the therapist’s largely facilitative and non-judgmental role makes
sense.78 In contrast, legal representation “is directed toward goals that are
external to the client”—requiring an external focus and at times decisive
action that impacts external circumstances.79
How might the attitudes and perspectives of Millennials inform de-
bates surrounding the rhetoric of “client autonomy” and “client-centered”
counseling? Three generational factors may contribute to how Millennials
approach lawyer-client relationships. First, to the extent that Millennials are
inclined to limit the extent to which “work” commitments and frameworks
place a claim on their lives and to assert that “My employer will know that /
they are not the most important thing in my life,” similar limits may inform
how they see their own work in relationship to client demands. Second, to
the extent that Millennials can be characterized as optimistic team builders,
they may be more inclined to see their clients not so much as “cornered”
but as imbedded in a web of relationships and so draw out the implications
of that web in the course of their dialogue. Finally, to the extent that the
“ideal career path” for a Millennial is “something in the field of making the
world a better place,” Millennials might also be more forward in their ef-
forts to “blend” their sense of social responsibility into their counseling
conversations with clients.
If Millennial cultural trajectories such as these begin to inform how
lawyers interact with clients, at what point will the phrase “client-centered”
fail to capture the complexity of the plural values of clients-in-relationship
who are no longer at the center but are part of a web of social commit-
ments?  At what point does the rhetoric of “client-centered” counseling fail
to capture the nuances of lawyers-in-relationship with clients, affirming
their clients’ moral responsibility for their decisions as well as their own
moral responsibility to their own web of social commitments? Might it be-
come something of a rhetorical stretch to characterize as “client-centered”
the realities of both lawyers and clients as embedded in complex social
contexts, with shifting economic and power dynamics? Millennials might
find that “client-centered” rhetoric is, in Brian’s turn of the phrase, “too
78. Kruse, supra note 64, at 386.
79. Id.
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reductive” to capture their sense of the full complexity and full potential in
the dynamic of lawyer-client relationships and conversations.80
3. Creating a Space for Common Reflection on the Common Good
Third, if it is true that Millennials resist the idea of a “quick fix soci-
ety” and are comfortable asserting the “shocking” proposal that “I can
change the world”—it might also be interesting to explore whether the shift
signals a readiness to move beyond mere procedural justice in order to
wrestle with foundational questions about substantive justice.
One of the problems with some aspects of postmodern supersensitivity
is that in practice its unending uncertainty can lead to paralysis. Gary
Blasi’s 1994 reflection is illustrative:
People are not representable in any ordered sense of self or inter-
ests. People are but eddies in the turbulent cross currents that
comprise them. All questions are contingent on assumptions that
are infinitely reflexive. All answers are evanescent, becoming
false even as they are spoken, as they suppress other questions
and other answers. In less radical form, we believe that we should
listen, knowing that we never fully understand and that we must
resist imposing our projected orderings and normative sense onto
others.81
As Kruse notes, “the client-centered approach’s original proscription
against lawyer advice-giving was based on a kind of epistemological skepti-
cism that a client’s values are ultimately unknowable to the lawyer.”82
Kruse, however, submits that it’s time to move on. “The claim may in some
sense be true, but it is based on a rigorous standard of epistemic certainty
that rarely governs our day-to-day activities.”83 As such, “[w]hile our in-
80. One resource for the broader rhetorical project might be to grapple with the extent to
which “self-interest” is actually in tension with other-regarding altruistic behavior. Scholars of
law, economics, and other disciplines are beginning to explore the tautology which lies at the
foundation of some current of altruism: When a theory of altruism assumes that other-regarding
behavior leads to a negative impact on the self, it is simply the flip side of theories of autonomous
self-interests. Theories of “relational self-interest,” on the other hand, posit that other-regarding
behavior can actually be in harmony with self-interest if fulfillment of the self is defined within a
relational framework. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Obligations of Lawyers to Heal
Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 1 (2011); see also Luigino Bruni & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Values and Cor-
porate Decision-Making: The Economy of Communion Project, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
645, 665 n.68 (2006) (discussing how the logic of gift transforms the conceptual analysis of altru-
ism); Amelia J. Uelmen, Caritas in Veritate and Chiara Lubich: Human Development from the
Vantage Point of Unity, 71 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 29, 38 (2010) (critiquing some theories of altru-
ism as the tautological flip side of individualism, “for they are grounded in an assumption that the
other’s interests are in fundamental tension with one’s own”).
81. Gary L. Blasi, What’s a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship,
48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1077–78 (1994).
82. Kruse, supra note 64, at 411.
83. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-2\UST207.txt unknown Seq: 22  7-DEC-12 10:15
2011] MILLENNIAL MOMENTUM 467
ability to know the ‘real values’ of someone else should give us pause, it
need not lead to paralysis.”84
Jurisprudence scholars agree that the time is ripe to again take up ques-
tions about the substantive nature of the good. As Robin West points out in
Normative Jurisprudence: An Introduction, progressives should turn to
questions about the substantive nature of the good because the purely proce-
dural approaches to jurisprudence have run out of steam and because they
matter to students: “The indeterminacy thesis, the dissolution of the distinc-
tion between law and politics, and the partial idealism behind some identity
claims that have been the major products of left academic life over the past
thirty years go nowhere near filling the need for explicit discussion of moral
value in the classroom.”85
If the more civic-minded Millennials maintain their claims that “[i]t
will be evident that / My peers and I care about this earth / No longer can it
be said that / Environmental destruction will be the norm,” and their convic-
tion that “I can change the world,” they are going to need the categories of
thought which open out toward the substantive nature of the good and of the
goods shared by the human family. And moving beyond the focus on proce-
dural justice is likely to have an important impact on the rhetoric describing
lawyers’ relationships and roles.
CONCLUSION: ENCOURAGING MILLENNIAL MOMENTUM THROUGH
CROSS-CULTURAL EXCHANGE
In conclusion, a word on one more characteristic of the Millennial gen-
eration that may prove to be an asset in the endeavor to reshape professional
paradigms: their openness and connectedness to international and global
perspectives. Millennials are more likely than any other generation to have
travelled internationally or to have had significant work or service experi-
ence in another country. They are poised to welcome new ideas, wherever
they find them. As one twenty-nine-year-old business manager explained:
Diversity means everything . . . an international perspective
as well as a domestic one. It’s different thought processes and
diverse communication styles. If we cannot be open and embrace
diversity, we limit our learning and progress, and we start asking
irritably, “Why isn’t our business competitive?”86
Given their readiness to pick up and blend ideas that strike them as
interesting and helpful, Millennials might be poised to engage with reflec-
tions on legal practice in other parts of the world. Returning to the dilemma
84. Id.
85. ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 57 (2011).
86. LYNNE C. LANCASTER & DAVID STILLMAN, THE M-FACTOR: HOW THE M GENERATION IS
ROCKING THE WORKPLACE 237 (2010); see also RONALD ALSOP, THE TROPHY KIDS GROW UP 17
(2008) (noting that Millennials have more frequent international work experience than previous
generations).
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that Habits of the Heart diagnosed—the American tendency to speak in the
language of “ontological individualism,” which neither matches nor fully
expresses one’s actual experience—engagement with rhetorical patterns
that describe professional life outside of the American experience might be
especially valuable.
Projects to foster such cross-cultural exposure among Millennials are
already underway. For example, in February 2009, more than 250 young
lawyers and law students from twenty-six different countries and five conti-
nents gathered in Rome for an international conversation, “Law in Search
of Justice.”87 The story of Isabelle de Moffarts, a lawyer who has practiced
for fifteen years with a small firm in Belgium, found particular resonance
with this group and thus might signal some of the emerging characteristics
of Millennial lawyering.88 From the tenor of her rhetoric, Moffarts does not
appear to be conditioned by the American diction of “ontological individu-
alism.” Some aspects of her approach to lawyer-client relationships follow
to the letter many of the substantive techniques of “client-centered” coun-
seling, but she expresses them in a diction more sensitive to the relational
web:
Starting with the effort to understand my clients, I try to establish
relationships of trust with them. Together we look for the best
solution, beginning with the situation as it is, even if we would
have wanted circumstances to be different. I respect their wishes,
of course within the limits of my conscience. I do not drag them
to a trial if they fear the cost and the consequences. I ask their
opinion before each decision. I try to open lines of communica-
tion with the client, resisting the “expert” temptation to control
every aspect of the process. . . . The more I “enter” into what the
client is living, the more I can express it, give reasons for behav-
ior and give a voice to feelings of injustice. It also helps the judge
better understand the situation.89
On the other hand, Moffarts found plenty of room for communicating
to clients her own values and convictions but with a humility which is care-
ful not to crush the client’s voice or own sense of responsibility and which
is ready to admit weakness or failure in the effort to fully comprehend the
client or her situation. She explained:
Clients come with their own perception of reality: a feeling of
injustice, a desire for revenge, the certainty of being right or an
attitude of victimization. I try to fully welcome them as they are,
but I also do not hesitate to speak up when I do not share their
87. Anne-Claire Motte, Reimagining the Legal Profession: Young Lawyers Explore and Ex-
perience How Justice Is Love in Action, LIVING CITY, June 2009, at 9. See generally Law in
Search of Justice, COMUNIONE E DIRITTO, http://comunionediritto.org/en/events-texts/youth-
congress-2009/105-27-febbraio-1-marzo-2009.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
88. Isabelle de Moffarts, Keywords for Lawyers, LIVING CITY, June 2009, at 7–8.
89. Id. at 7.
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vision of reality. Suffering can blind people to the fact that the
other side may have legitimate reasons for their actions. I feel it is
my duty to share my point of view with my client, with respect
and readiness to accept that I may have not fully understood the
situation. I see that this relationship of truth gives deep roots to
our collaboration and often leads to profound agreement on a par-
ticular strategy. When clients choose an option that I would not
have chosen, I respectfully inform them of my reservations.90
Further, for Moffarts, adversaries and third parties are also an essential
part of the relational web:
Respect for the client is an obvious principle of our profession,
but I also feel called to respect my adversaries. I try to use exact
words to describe facts without unnecessarily denigrating the op-
ponent. This can be very difficult in practice, especially when you
are in the heat of the conflict. The judge often appreciates the
capacity to step back and stick to the facts and concrete claims
without useless aggression. This attitude does not keep me from
strongly denouncing injustice. In fact, the more I live the value of
respect, the better I can present my client’s claims. And each time
I recognize my mistakes or the mistakes of my clients, it increases
my own credibility. By not pretending to be right on everything, I
have more authority to ask for what I see as right.91
The internal balance that Moffarts has struck between sensitivity to her
client’s story, reality, and desires, her own personal values and convictions,
and her respect for third parties has helped her to help her clients discern
their course of action even amidst conflicting emotions and goals. She gives
one example:
At the end of the Christmas holiday this past year one of my
clients phoned me, panicked because her son’s father had refused
to return the boy to her custody and had indicated that he intended
to bring him to the African country where he works. All of this
was in violation of the custody agreement. There were many le-
gitimate reasons to be outraged by this, and I immediately moved
for a hearing before the court. The law was clearly on my client’s
side, even if the boy had given false testimony to the police that
she was mistreating him.
By really listening to my client, however, I came to understand that,
even though she was very angry, she also appreciated that the boy really
wanted to live with his father. It was not that he was unhappy with her, but
rather that he needed his father at this point in his development. This under-
standing complicated my client’s goals. If we were to consider the “best
90. Id.
91. Id.
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interests” of the child, it no longer meant “winning” the case, which would
have been pretty easy.
The new goal was to renegotiate the custody agreement so that the
boy’s transfer to his father would also guarantee the relationship with his
mother at a distance. At times, it was difficult to navigate my client’s emo-
tions and competing desires. Creativity and perseverance were needed, but
after three weeks of tough negotiations, the boy flew to Africa, peaceful and
sure of both his parents’ love.92
This particular story has a happy ending, but Moffarts admits that her
practice also brings her face to face with suffering, failure, powerlessness,
and doubt. On the deepest level, she reflects, “I cannot heal a raped girl. I
cannot bring a child back to life. I cannot reconcile the parents who are set
on destroying each another. I cannot shield the despairing foreigner from
expulsion.”93 And on a professional level,
I also experience a sense of suffering and failure when I re-
ceive a decision that seems absurd, when it seems that the judge
did not listen to arguments that, in my opinion, were well-
founded, or when I notice that I am giving way to the logic of the
conflict, forgetting my great ideals. Many of these “whys” remain
without answers. My task is to live this drama fully, to be there to
accompany those who suffer so as to protect their human
dignity.94
If the receptivity of the law students and young lawyers at the “Law in
Search of Justice Conference” to Moffarts’s approach was any indication of
what Millennials might contribute to current reflections on the lawyer’s
role, perhaps we should begin to see how our structures of legal education
and professional formation can begin to absorb this hopeful “shock” that the
Millennials refuse to believe that their generation of lawyers will be “lost,”
and they really do believe that they “can change the world.”95
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 7–8.
95. See Reed, supra note 19. R
